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Despite digitization and platformization, mass media and established media companies 
still play a crucial role in the provision of journalistic content in democratic societies. 
Competition is one key driver of (media) company behavior and is considered to have an 
impact on the media’s performance. However, theory and empirical research are 
ambiguous about the relationship. The objective of this article is to empirically analyze the 
effect of competition on media performance in a cross-national context. We assessed 
media performance of media companies as the importance of journalistic goals within their 
stated corporate goal system. We conducted a content analysis of letters to the 
shareholders in annual reports of more than 50 media companies from 2000 to 2014 to 
operationalize journalistic goal importance. When employing a fixed effects regression 
analysis, as well as a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, results suggest that 
competition has a positive effect on the importance of journalistic goals, while the 
existence of a strong public service media sector appears to have the effect of “crowding 
out” commercial media companies. 
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Even in times of increasing digitization, networked media, and the emergence of powerful platforms 
(van Dijck, Poell, & de Waal, 2018), traditional media companies still play a crucial role in democratic societies. 
This is particularly because they are expected to contribute to the fulfillment of media’s democratic functions, 
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a concept often referred to as media performance (Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng & White, 2009; 
McQuail, 1992). It is vital to understand which conditions improve media performance to be able to find the 
right policies to promote high-quality media production and eventually foster a functioning media system that 
serves democracy and the public interest. Especially in light of rising concerns that digital platform and tech 
giants are not sufficiently fulfilling their societal role in maintaining a functioning public sphere (e.g., in terms 
of misinformation, hate speech, or echo chambers), the importance of traditional journalism for democratic 
states has become even more evident (e.g., Pickard, 2020). 
 
One of the most debated relationships in this domain is the effect of competition on commercial 
media companies’ journalistic performance. Although it is one key driver of company behavior, theory and 
empirical research are ambiguous about its effect on media performance. The financial commitment 
approach (FCA), for instance, hypothesizes a positive impact of competition on media performance (Litman 
& Bridges, 1986). The hypercompetition approach also expects positive effects, but only for low levels of 
competition, and a negative effect beyond a certain threshold (Hollifield, 2006). Media bias research 
grounded in economics literature has dealt with the effects of competition on the accuracy and impartiality 
of media reporting and has presented conflicting ideas on the sign of the effect of competition on media bias 
(Besley & Prat, 2006; Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005). 
 
In addition, despite globalization, most of the empirical research on media performance has been 
restricted to one country or region. The first studies on FCA, for instance, focused on regional U.S. markets, 
others on the Netherlands (Van der Wurff & Van Cuilenburg, 2001) or the European media market (Russi, 
Siegert, Gerth, & Krebs, 2014). Amid increasing media convergence, those studies are mostly limited to one 
specific media market, usually TV or newspapers; newer studies also have addressed online news (e.g., 
Humprecht, 2016). Cross-cultural quantitative analyses are the exception and only exist—at least to our 
knowledge—for developing countries (Hollifield, 2006). Thus, especially in the light of globalization and 
media convergence, an empirical assessment of the effects of competition on media performance in a cross-
national setting and across media industries is still a research gap that needs to be addressed. 
 
We attempted to tackle this issue by collecting data about the corporate goal system from 46 media 
companies in 12 countries and five continents to answer whether increasing competition intensity—
measured as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and the National Media Power Index (MPI)—and the 
existence of strong public service media affect commercial media companies’ media performance. Our 
results address the persisting research gap and provide media policy implications. 
 
We contribute to existing research in four ways: (1) We measured media performance in a novel 
way by conducting a content analysis of letters to shareholders of annual reports from media companies 
from 2000 to 2014 explicitly seeking the mention of corporate goals. This allowed us to come up with a 
quantitative measure of the relative importance of stated journalistic goals in media companies. We 
deliberately focused on established media companies because they are expected to continue producing and 
distributing journalistic content, something that is not generally demanded of new global tech players. (2) 
We analyzed our data employing two empirical analysis techniques to answer our research questions, 
namely a fixed effects regression analysis and a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). These 
two approaches are different in their causal analysis (correlation-based vs. Boolean algebra), yielding a 
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much broader and more conservative analysis. (3) With our cross-national data set, we were able to grasp 
a fundamental transition in media systems worldwide, significantly expanding the scope of existing research 
in this domain, providing new opportunities regarding the generalizability of the results. (4) We explicitly 
assessed the effect of competition from public service media (PSM) on commercial media companies’ media 
performance and therefore differentiated between competition from commercial media companies and PSM. 
 
With this article, we particularly intend to contribute to the progress of knowledge in the field of 
media competition and media performance studies by addressing persistent research gaps. However, the 
article also supports media policymakers and regulators to select the right means to strengthen media 
performance among national media markets. 
 




Media performance describes the fulfillment of media’s democratic functions by certain actors (e.g., 
commercial media companies) measured against normative criteria. Although there is no general consensus 
on these criteria or their respective relevance (Christians et al., 2009; McQuail, 1992; Müller, 2014), 
according to McQuail (1992), criteria for media performance can be derived from the basic democratic 
principles of freedom, justice/equality, and order/solidarity. Taking these as a basis, concrete standards can 
be derived regarding the democratic requirements and public roles of media companies, such as accuracy, 
completeness, and neutrality in reporting (McQuail, 2008). If these standards are met, the mass media best 
serve the public interest by maximizing the democratic values of freedom, equality, and order. This allows 
for a “systematic critical analysis of the conduct and content of mass media in pursuing their stated or 
expected objectives” (McQuail, 2016, p. 1). We thus understand media performance as the degree to which 
mass media fulfill their democratic functions and best serve the public interest. 
 
Because our article focuses on the effect of competition in media markets on media performance, 
in the following, we review previous research that has dealt with the influence of competition on specific 
facets of media performance. First, we discuss the financial commitment approach (FCA) as well as the 
hypercompetition approach (HA). Both of these approaches explicitly focus on the effect of competition on 
media performance. To broaden the scope, we then also consider media diversity, media bias research, and 
ownership consolidation research, all concepts that are related to media performance. Although these 
concepts are not explicitly tested in the empirical part of this article, they still provide valuable insights into 
the general relationship between competition and media performance. 
 
The Financial Commitment Approach (FCA) 
 
The FCA is the most frequently discussed and reviewed theory. The term financial commitment was 
originally introduced by Litman and Bridges (1986) and later clarified by Stephen Lacy and other scholars 
(Lacy, 1992; Lacy, Atwater, & Qin, 1989; Lacy, Fico, & Simon, 1989). 
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FCA explains the relationship between competition and media performance in a four-step model. 
In the first step, depending on the intensity of competition in the media market, a media firm has to choose 
what Lacy (1992) defines as “the amount of money committed to news content” (p. 8). In a highly 
competitive market, given a substitutional relation among the competitors, the necessity to attract 
customers through differentiated high-quality content becomes more relevant. Step 2 hypothesizes a 
positive correlation between the budget for news content and the quality of the content. Thus, a high degree 
of financial commitment should result in high content quality. Although the definition of content quality 
varies, the model assumes that journalists follow a certain code of quality journalism labeled by 
characteristics such as “fairness, balance, and completeness” (Lacy, 1992, p. 8). These are closely related 
to criteria for media performance (Christians et al., 2009; McQuail, 1992). Step 3 states the recipient’s 
utility to increase with raising content quality, given the assumption that journalists and audiences share 
the same definition of quality journalism. Step 4 draws the final expectation that increasing the recipient’s 
utility leads to a higher attractiveness of the medium, which results in increasing circulation and therefore 
better market performance. 
 
In particular, Step 3 of the approach—that higher journalistic quality leads to higher demand—is 
subject to debate. On the one hand, higher quality news appears to have a positive impact on demand, 
especially when it is signaled to readers and viewers through journalism awards (Logan & Sutter, 2004; 
Wellbrock & Wolfram, 2019). On the other hand, demand for journalistic quality has also been modeled in 
a curvilinear fashion, such that certain parts of the audience do not value higher quality in this regard 
(Battaggion & Vaglio, 2018; Leroch & Wellbrock, 2011). 
 
In the cases of newspapers, TV, and radio, research has generally supported the hypothesis of a 
causal relation between financial commitment and the media performance of the outlet (Russi et al., 2014). 
Before and after the publication of Stephen Lacy’s approach, scholars have found evidence for the likelihood 
that competition intensity increases financial commitment to news production (Busterna, 1980; Cho, 
Thorson, & Lacy, 2004; Lacy & Blanchard, 2003; Litman & Bridges, 1986). Yet, the model underlies certain 
time and regional boundaries. The studies that were taken as a basis for the model’s assumptions and 
causalities were predominantly examined from the mid-1980s until the end of the 1990s. Furthermore, they 
focused on local U.S. newspaper markets. These markets are characterized by an oligopolistic, or even 
duopolistic, market structure. It is questionable whether the linear effects of the model can be applied to 
other market structures (Lacy, 1992). Despite these doubts, Lacy and Riffe (1994) argue that the availability 
of resources and the gained profit might also have an impact on the financial commitment. The restrictions 
led scholars to extend the model and develop an approach that takes the boundaries into account. 
 
The Hypercompetition Approach (HA) 
 
The extension of the FCA is the HA, which supplements the potential adverse effects of competition 
on media performance in hypercompetitive markets (Becker, Hollifield, Jacobsson, Jacobsson, & Vlad, 2009; 
Hollifield, 2006). These two approaches can be considered part of the same theoretical approach. Instead of 
an infinite linear relationship between competition and media performance, as it was supposed in markets with 
a low-to-moderate degree of competition (oligopolies, duopolies), the HA states that competition for limited 
resources leads to a threshold beyond which competition has a negative effect on media performance. 
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Hollifield (2006) argues that if the degree of competition and the market size are not growing 
proportionally, the case of higher competition (increasing number of media organizations) and limited 
resources (e.g., limited number of professional journalists) favor a negative development of content quality. 
The model expects that as soon as the degree of competition exceeds the threshold of low-to-moderate 
competition, profits decline, financial commitment to news production declines, and low-cost strategies of 
product differentiation are put into place to compensate for the losses rather than investing in content 
quality. The state of hypercompetition causes critically low profit levels for competitors, followed by 
expenditure cut-offs, and ultimately market exits as the final result. 
 
The model therefore presumes that the relationship between competition and media performance 
has to be curvilinear, although the optimum level of competition, which ensures the highest quality of 
journalism, is difficult to identify both empirically and theoretically. As a consequence, empirical evaluations 
of the approach are scarce. 
 
A prime example for an empirical test of the theory is the work of Becker et al. (2009), who used 
secondary data from 20 countries with emerging, highly competitive media markets gathered by the 
International Research and Exchanges Board. They treated the gross domestic product of the countries as 
a rough surrogate for advertising resources and divided it by the total number of media outlets to measure 
market competition. The study concluded that moderate competition in the market leads to higher 
journalistic quality, whereas a higher degree of competition may have a negative impact on news quality. 
Even though the findings of their study are tentative, the research provides a valuable first step in finding 
evidence on the likelihood that high levels of competition can have negative effects on media performance. 
 
Competition and Media Diversity 
 
The second line of research used is the approach by Van der Wurff and Van Cuilenburg (2001). 
Already in 1999, Van Cuilenburg combined characteristics of the FCA with Hotelling’s (1929) law of 
“excessive sameness” (p. 54). Van der Wurff and Van Cuilenburg chose media diversity as the determining 
factor of media performance and argue that ruinous competition favors excessive sameness, pointing in the 
same direction as the HA. 
 
Van der Wurff and Van Cuilenburg (2001) argue that as competition intensifies, sensational content 
or content of major interest ensures more promising revenue streams because it tends to meet majority 
preferences: “Free media markets tend to excel in market conformity, but tend to fail in market dynamics” 
(Van Cuilenburg, 1999, p. 197). 
 
Empirical tests of the model—based on analyses classifying content into program type categories and 
primarily conducted in the Dutch newspaper and television markets—have confirmed the hypothesis (Van 
Cuilenburg, 2007; Van der Wurff, 2004, 2005; Van der Wurff & Van Cuilenburg, 2001). More specifically, the 
researchers examined the possibility of a linear relationship between competition and diversity. Their findings 
generally support the model concluding that moderate and ruinous competition individually, and differently, 
affects diversity. These outcomes appear to match the general propositions of the HA. 
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Competition and Media Bias 
 
A third projection is the theory of media bias. In economics literature, media bias is usually defined 
as a deviation from fair, balanced, and impartial reporting (Wellbrock, 2016). Other descriptions of the 
concept include “selective omission, choice of words, and varying credibility ascribed to the primary source” 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006, p. 2) and “a portrayal of reality that is significantly and systematically (not 
randomly) distorted” (Groeling, 2013, p. 133). 
 
In this sense, the existence of media bias—violating journalistic quality standards such as fairness, 
balance, and impartiality—would consequently harm media performance given that complying with 
journalistic quality standards is necessary for a media product to fulfill mass media’s functions in a 
democratic society and support the democratic value system, as required by the media performance concept 
(McQuail, 1992). 
 
If competition affects media bias, competition can also affect media performance via media bias. 
In this respect, the existence of media bias can directly or indirectly reduce media performance (e.g., Baron, 
2006; Blasco & Sobbrio, 2012; Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005). In contrast to the first two theoretical 
approaches, media bias research provides models for both a positive and a negative influence of competition 
on media bias and therefore media performance. 
 
A common way to classify causes for media bias is to differentiate between supply side and demand 
side. On the supply side, owners (Anderson & McLaren, 2012), journalists, interest groups (Petrova, 2012), 
and advertisers (Ellman & Germano, 2009; Germano & Meier, 2013) might have an interest in skewing 
media reports. This can be driven by ideology, for example, when owners or journalists try to communicate 
their personal political beliefs because they think it is “the right thing to do.” It can also be economically 
driven, for example, because advertisers prefer favorable reporting about themselves, because journalists 
report in ways that maximize their career opportunities, or because owners run a media outlet to support 
their political or business careers. 
 
Research in the supply side domain usually comes to the conclusion that competition reduces media 
bias (and therefore enhances media performance). The main reason behind this is that it becomes more 
expensive and riskier to “buy” favorable reporting for advertisers or interest groups because they would 
have to “bribe” more media outlets and, because those media outlets compete with each other, they have 
an incentive to expose incorrect behavior from competitors (see, e.g., Besley & Prat, 2006). 
 
Concerning the demand side, the most common approach in explaining media bias is the incentive 
for profit-maximizing companies to meet consumer preferences. As individuals usually prefer information 
that confirms their prior beliefs and attitudes (confirmation bias) rather than accurate, balanced, and diverse 
reporting, profit-maximizing companies can have an incentive to provide ideologically slanted news 
(Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005). A similar approach is presented by Sobbrio (2013) who does not focus on 
the (biased) dissemination of information, but its (biased) collection. In this world with heterogeneous 
consumer preferences, competition tends to increase media bias because companies will try to differentiate 
their products according to predispositions and consumers’ beliefs. Compared with the aforementioned 
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approaches, product differentiation does not come via quality (FCA) or diversity of opinions (Media 
Diversity), but via a distorted representation of reality that corresponds to consumer attitudes and beliefs 
(Anand, Di Tella, & Galetovic, 2007; Chan & Suen, 2008; Stone, 2011). 
 
Ownership Consolidation in Newspaper Markets 
 
In her study on the effects of newspaper mergers on welfare, Fan (2013) addresses several aspects 
that are associated with media performance and that relate to several of the above-mentioned approaches. 
Fan found that ownership consolidation of newspapers in the Minneapolis area led to decreases in content 
quality, local news ratio, and variety. 
 
Fan (2013) measured content quality with an index consisting of the size of the news hole, the 
number of staff in opinion sections, and the number of reporters, a mixture of content-related measurements 
(size of the news hole) and financial commitment measures (number of staff in opinion sections and number 
of reporters). Content variety was also—maybe surprisingly—measured according to the financial 
commitment approach as it refers to the allocation and concentration of staff across newspaper sections. 
This also holds true for local news ratio, a metric that might also be considered an indicator of media 
performance for local media outlets. This was measured as the percentage of local news staff over total staff 
and therefore not as an outcome variable. 
 
Although Fan (2013) comes to the clear conclusion that a decrease in competition harms media 
performance, in the sense that it leads to decreases in content quality, local news ratio, and content variety, 
the study explicitly addressed only duopoly and triopoly markets. This leaves room for the key argument of 
other approaches that competition might have an adverse effect on media performance beyond a certain 
threshold of competition intensity. 
 




To sum up, existing research is ambiguous when it comes to the effect of competition on media 
performance. Whereas most authors come to the conclusion that an increase in competition should have a 
positive effect on quality commitment at low initial levels of competition (FCA, HA, some media bias studies), 
others argue the opposite (e.g., for higher levels of competition, some media bias approaches). 
Furthermore, previous studies have focused solely on single dimensions of media performance. We 
attempted to tackle both issues empirically at the company level by addressing media companies’ corporate 
goals as communicated through letters to the shareholders in annual reports. 
 
Competition, however, consists of different aspects, especially in the media industries. On the one 
hand, commercial media companies face competition from rival commercial enterprises. Therefore, our first 
research question reads as follows: 
 
RQ1: What is the effect of competition intensity among commercial media companies on media performance? 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Competition and Media Performance  6161 
On the other hand, a media-specific phenomenon is the existence of strong PSM in some countries 
that strongly differ from privately held, commercial players. Although PSM might serve as some kind of 
benchmark leading to a “race to the top” with commercial companies with regards to quality programming 
(e.g., British Broadcasting Company, 2013) and therefore improving media performance, the opposite 
“crowding out” effect could also occur (e.g., Armstrong & Weeds, 2007; Sehl, Fletcher, & Picard, 2020; Torii, 
2017). The reason for this is that commercial companies might try to avoid competition with a better-
equipped public competitor in the field of high-quality journalism by refraining from taking part in this 
particular content spectrum. This could be because (1) PSM are legally obliged to produce what is usually 
considered to be high-quality content in the public service sense; and (2) it is usually costly to produce this 
type of content, and strong PSM usually have an advantage in terms of resources in the form of license fees. 
Therefore, commercial media companies might be “crowded out” in markets with strong PSM, in terms of 
high-quality journalistic content, rather than competing in a “race to the top.” This leads to our second 
research question: 
 
RQ2: What is the effect of a strong PSM sector on media performance of commercial media companies? 
 
Operationalization of Competition 
 
We operationalized competition intensity by using concentration rates, namely the HHI and the 
MPI. Although there are also other popular concentration measures, such as concentration ratios (e.g., CR4 
and CR8), we used the HHI and MPI first because they take into account all members of the industry (except 
for PSM, which was included separately). Second, the HHI is one of the most commonly used metrics for 
assessing market concentration and competition, both in academia and in regulation practice. The HHI is 
the sum of all squared market shares (in percentages) of all members in an industry, in this case, the media 
industry. It ranges between zero, where the share of each firm is infinitely small (indicating low 
concentration and high competition), and 10,000, where a single firm accounts for the entire market share 
(indicating high concentration and low competition). In addition to this, there was readily available data on 
media industry HHI for the countries in our sample from a single source (Noam, 2015). 
 
Whereas the HHI is an industry-specific measure, the MPI is a cross-industry measure that takes 
into account weighted market shares that companies have in several media markets (e.g., print, audiovisual 
media, telecom, and search engines; Noam, 2015, p. 24). It ranges between zero and 10,000. The data 
were also provided by Noam (2015). 
 
Operationalization of Media Performance 
 
For the dependent variable, we assessed media performance of media companies as the importance 
of journalistic goals within their corporate goal systems. We operationalized this by conducting a content 
analysis of “letters to shareholders” in annual reports of media companies. Specifically, the dependent 
variable is the share of paragraphs in a letter that contains at least one journalistic goal. 
 
Annual reports are regarded as a very useful source to study corporate goals. It is widely accepted 
that the topics mentioned in the letters reflect the preferred structure of top management and their strategic 
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commitments (Hauschildt & Hamel, 1978; Kaluza, 1982; Werner, 1990). Previous research in economics 
has shown that these letters contain relevant information to explain company performance and behavior 
(e.g., Smith, 2019). The established correlation between the content of these letters and company behavior 
produces an ideal setting to find new relations with other factors, such as competition. 
 
Although the analysis of narrative portions, such as the letter to the shareholders, is an 
established method in economics, finance, and accounting research (Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Li, 2010; 
Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007), to our knowledge, it is a novel way to measure media performance. 
Existing research on media performance has usually analyzed journalistic content (e.g., Humprecht, 
2016; Wessler & Rinke, 2014), used organizational indicators and financial commitment (Hollifield, 2006), 
or relied on expert assessments (Lacy & Rosenstiel, 2015). The main advantages of our approach, 
compared with previous ones, include the comparability of the data between companies and countries, 
which has become particularly important in the context of the globalization of media and communication. 
Cross-company and cross-country comparability is usually difficult when depending on data generated 
from content analysis of the actual journalistic product (e.g., due to different journalistic traditions; 
Hanitzsch, Hanusch, Ramaprasad, & De Beer, 2019) or from organizational and financial commitment 
measures. These tend to be more subject to company size and cultural differences than letters to 
shareholders (which should follow similar standards, at least across the sample we used). Moreover, 
although content analysis of journalistic content can usually only measure certain aspects of media 
performance (e.g., analytical depth, critical distance, or topic diversity, as in Humprecht, 2016), we can 
interpret the importance of journalistic goals (as stated by the companies) as a measurement of the 
construct as a whole rather than measurements of selected aspects. 
 
Against this background, we believe that a content analysis of letters to shareholders is an adequate 
way of empirically assessing corporate goals and thus media performance. We refrained from running a 
management survey because this is usually subject to many typical survey data problems. For instance, 
representativeness is hard to reach, mainly because of low response rates and possible self-selection biases. 
In addition, validation problems due to potential strategic and socially desirable answers also occur (Bednar 
& Westphal, 2006). Eisenbeis (2007), for instance, conducted both a management survey and a content 
analysis of letters to shareholders and in some parts came up with significantly different results. We believe 
this can be attributed to the aforementioned problems with management survey data. 
 
Obviously, our measurement has its own weaknesses. First, the formulation of a goal does not 
automatically mean its implementation in corporate practice. Second, letters to shareholders are to a 
certain extent subject to impression management (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). However, managers 
can be held accountable for what they say in public, especially in a legal document such as an annual 
report. Despite these limitations, we applied the relative importance of journalistic objectives in letters 
to shareholders of companies’ annual reports (measured as relative frequency of mentions) as a measure 
of media performance. 
 
To analyze journalistic goals of media companies, we relied on a stream of literature pioneered in 
Great Britain by Tunstall (1971, 1972), who developed a categorical system that rudimentarily divides 
corporate goals into three types: an audience-revenue goal, an advertising-revenue goal, and a nonprofit 
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goal. Subsequently, Alter (1985) studied corporate goals of public service broadcasters in Switzerland 
through document analysis, including a content-related communication goal and classic corporate goals, to 
achieve a comprehensive list of 112 goals. Demers (1996) devised a survey comprising 21 goals for 409 
managers, editors, and journalists of private U.S. newspapers to rate them according to their relevance. 
However, the lack of distinction between journalists and management clouds the results. Eisenbeis (2007) 
proposed a model that combines knowledge from empirical management studies and media management 
to deduce 28 corporate goal categories for media companies. He analyzed annual reports of eight German 
media companies and surveyed 101 managers and journalists from those companies. The study is an 
important precedent and role model in terms of assessing corporate goals. Similar to previous studies, there 
is no clear distinction between economic and journalistic goals, as one general “quality” category makes up 
the totality of quality goals, thereby not addressing the question of specific journalistic goals. Both Demers 
and Eisenbeis identified profits, circulation/reach, and customer satisfaction as the most important corporate 
goals for media companies. 
 
Previous studies have acknowledged the issue of dualist corporate goals in media companies, and 
they account for the differentiation of purely economic goals that transcend industries and quality goals that 
are specific to media. Nonetheless, they either lack transparency in the determination of goal categories, or 
they subordinate the journalistic goals to the economic ones, assuming them to be inferior. The present 
study addressed this matter by providing a theory-driven list of corporate goals and establishing corporate 
goal categories that specifically refer to journalistic goals. 
 
Table 1 shows a catalogue of 60 corporate goal categories. From these, 37 are of economic nature, 
14 are journalistic, and nine are societal. With respect to economic and societal goals, we relied on 
established economic and business management studies, and journalistic goals were derived against the 
background of our conceptualization of media performance and in relation to previous studies on media 
companies’ goal systems (Alter, 1985; Demers, 1996; Eisenbeis, 2007; Fritz, Förster, Wiedmann, & Raffée, 
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Table 1. Corporate Goal Categories. 
Economic Journalistic Societal 
• Company continuance 
• Company success 
• Company size 
• Growth (unspecific, in general) 
• Competitiveness 
• Product quality (industrial organization-
/business-/market- related definition) 
• Innovation 
• Product development 
• Service quality 
• Product portfolio 
• Customer loyalty 
• Customer satisfaction, satisfaction of 
consumer preferences 
• Satisfaction of advertisers’ needs 
• Reach (TV ratings/circulation) 
• Company image 
• Core competencies 
• Revenue, sales 
• Cost(s) 
• Market share 
• Market power, market influence 
• Expansion, cooperation, networks 
• Consolidation, focusing 
• Corporate risk 
• Independence, autonomy 
• Profit; income; earnings; earnings 
before interest, taxes/earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization; surplus; company result 
• Rentability, return on investment 
• Company value, shareholder value 
• Dividend 
• Liquidity, credit worthiness, credit 
rating, financial independence, 
accounts payable, debt, accounts 
receivable, allowance, financial basis 
• Capital structure, capital changes 
• Cash flow 
• Marginal return, contribution margin 
• Capacity utilization 
• Journalistic quality 
• Responsible 
reporters, standing 
of the newsroom 
• Effects of journalism 
on society 
• Fulfilment of media’s 
democratic 
functions 
• Agenda setting 




• Activation function 




• Participation in 
public opinion 
making 
• Localism, local and 




• Political influence, public 
affairs, lobbying, influence 
on regulation 
• Corporate culture 
• Employee satisfaction, 
loyalty, responsibility for 
employees 
• Income and social security 
• Jobs 
• Sponsorships for social 
institutions, patronage 
• Diversity 
• Quality of life for society 
• Environmental protection  
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Given that past empirical research has often neglected the role of journalistic goals in media 
companies, we primarily based our approach on criteria developed in media performance research 
(Christians et al., 2009; McQuail, 1992; Müller, 2014). As there is no clear consensus as to which criteria 
are the most important for democracy, we adopted a broad catalogue of democratic requirements and public 
roles of media companies and examined whether they manifest in media companies’ goal systems. Even 
though journalistic goals could also be categorized as societal goals, we defined them as those goals that a 
media company aims to achieve through journalistic means (production and distribution of content and its 
impact). Societal goals, on the other hand, are often pursued by means of corporate social responsibility or 




Summing up our approach, we employed a content analysis of letters to the shareholders in annual 
reports of 46 media companies from 2000 to 2014 to operationalize journalistic goal importance. We 
considered this a measure of media performance. We then paired these data with indexes and proxies for 
competition: the HHI for national media markets, the MPI (Noam, 2015), and a dummy variable for the 
existence of strong PSM. Figure 1 summarizes our research setting. 
 
 
Figure 1. Operationalization of concepts. PSM = public service media; HHI = Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index; MPI = National Media Power Index. 
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Method 
 
Sample and Data 
 
Country and company selection were mainly driven by data availability, in particular availability of 
annual reports and linguistic capabilities within the researcher team (English, German, French, Spanish, and 
Portuguese). Another necessary criterion was a Press Freedom Index status of “noticeable problems” or 
higher (“good situation,” “satisfactory situation”; Reporters Without Borders, 2013) to ensure a general 
orientation of the media system toward democratic values. We also aimed at a sufficient country size, in 
terms of population, of at least 20 million people to maintain comparability across countries. 
 
A total of 46 content companies formed the database for this study, as displayed in Table 2. We 
defined content companies according to Noam (2015) as companies whose business model relies on the 
creation or publishing of content, and excluded platform companies (such as Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, and 
Bell Canada) that primarily engage in distribution.1 We selected the largest available companies in each 
country according to revenue. 
 
Table 2. Sample of Media Companies. 
United States Germany Canada United Kingdom Australia 
Disney Axel Springer Astal Guardian Media 
Group 
APN News & Media 
Gannett Gruner+Jahr Rogers 
Communications 
Northern & Shell  Fairfax Media 
McClatchy ProSiebenSat1 Shaw 
Communications 
Economist Group Seven West Media 
Ltd News Corp RTL  Archant Limited Ten Network 
Holdings New York Times Premiere/Sky    
Time Warner Burda    
Washington Post Madsack    
 Bauer    
 Bertelsmann    
South Africa France India Spain Brazil Mexico Argentina 
Times Media 
Group 
Groupe Bolloré Zee Entertainment  Vocento RBS Televis
a 
Clarin 





Primedia  NRJ Group H.T. Media Mediaset    
Caxton/CTP Vivendi  Prisa    
 
Concerning the independent variables, we used data on the HHI and MPI from Noam (2015). The 
lowest HHI value in our sample was for the United States in 2000 (618), and the highest was for Mexico for 
that same year (5,446). The lowest MPI score also came from the United States in 2000 (1,266), and the 
highest was observed in South Africa (7,058). 
 
 
1 This decision was confirmed after running separate analyses for content and platform companies, which 
yielded structurally different results. 
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We also included a variable for countries where PSM hold a significant portion of the audience share 
(>10%) and therefore become strong competitors for private media companies. PSM organizations are 
media companies that are publicly funded, legally obliged to serve the public, and are sufficiently 
independent of economic and political influences. Due to the last criterion being especially hard to objectively 
assess, we based our selection on existing studies dealing with categorizing public media (Nowak, 2014) 
and expert expertise. We considered the United Kingdom, Germany, and France media systems that are 
characterized by the existence of a strong PSM organization. 
 
We studied the letters to shareholders in annual reports available from all companies, spanning the 
years 2000–2014. 
 
We encountered some cases in which the largest company, or one of the largest, in a particular 
country is a foreign one, and the local branch of the company is included in the annual reports and 
shareholders’ letters of the headquarters in the parent company’s country. In these cases, the company was 
included only once for the original country and not in the foreign markets regardless of its audience, size, 
or share of the media market. Some companies investigated focus more on nonjournalistic content (e.g., 
entertainment media content). However, our central criterion was that they too offer journalistic products. 
 
The analysis was conducted at the paragraph level of the letters to shareholders: Each paragraph 
was analyzed separately and each statement that qualified as a potential goal was coded from the list of 
possible goals as displayed in Table 1. The list allowed for open coding; however, this option was hardly 
used because the list was sufficiently developed. At the paragraph level, the coding determined whether a 
goal from the list of corporate goals was mentioned in each paragraph. The coding marked in binary terms 
whether the goal was present or not in each paragraph, holding the number of times it appeared in the 
paragraph irrelevant. 
 
Methodologically, the role model for this study was the procedure used by Eisenbeis (2007). 
Typographically, paragraphs are bound within line brakes and often with a line. Headings, signatures, or 
emphasis lines out of the text were excluded in the coding, and general statements regarding external 
conditions or events (e.g., the state of the economy) were not considered goals and therefore were not coded. 
 
In total, we analyzed 46 companies (see Table 2) in 12 countries, a total of 474 reports with 1,393 
pages and 10,073 paragraphs. We found 21,267 unique goal mentions in 8,360 paragraphs; 1,710 
paragraphs did not contain any corporate goals. 
 
To assess intercoder reliability, a second coder coded a total of 32 letters to shareholders (6.75% 
of the total sample). Krippendorff’s alpha values were good to very good for the three key variables derived 
from the content analysis (share of paragraphs with at least one journalistic, societal, and economic goal), 
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Regression Analysis 
 
To assess the effect of competition on media performance, we first ran a fixed effects regression 
analysis. Apart from the variables that were of foremost interest for this study—HHI, MPI, PSM, journalistic 
goals—we added a set of control variables to the model. The first group of control variables were 
characteristics of every individual letter to shareholders in an annual corporate report. They included the 
length of the letter in number of pages and in number of paragraphs. 
 
Various market performance indicators were also considered as control variables: revenue growth; 
earnings before interest, taxes/earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization growth; net 
profit growth; self-reported market share; and whether or not the company is publicly traded. This last factor 
has been identified as relevant in determining the focus of private media companies through the assumption 
that publicly listed companies pursue different goals than family-owned or single-investor companies. 
 
We also controlled for the general state of the economy and the economic state of the media 
industry. Proxies were gross domestic product growth rate, inflation rate, and unemployment rate (provided 
by the World Bank, 2015) and the growth rate of the national advertising market (provided by local entities 
in each of the countries, 2000–2014). From the aforementioned coding and variables, we estimated linear 
models including year fixed effects. 
 
Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
To our knowledge, Russi et al. (2014) were the first to apply fsQCA to a media-specific question. 
They addressed a very similar question by evaluating the relationship between competition intensity and 
financial commitment of newspaper companies in German-speaking countries. A more recent example of a 
study that used fsQCA in a media industry setting is Humprecht (2016). She employed QCA to investigate 
drivers of news performance in six Western democracies. 
 
As opposed to regression analysis, QCA does not estimate the net effect of a single explanatory variable 
on the dependent variable, but rather seeks to identify necessary and/or sufficient conditions for an outcome. 
This set theoretic principle of causality explicitly allows for combinations of conditions to form necessary or 
sufficient conditions, which is a structural difference to regression analysis (Ragin, 2008) and where it is difficult 
to interpret three-way and higher interactions. One downside of QCA is that the number of explanatory 
conditions is more limited compared with regression analysis to yield meaningful results (Humprecht, 2016). 
 
Whereas regression (and statistical analysis in general) depends on correlation and covariance 
between variables, QCA is a set theoretic approach and is based on Boolean algebra. A so-called truth table 
is created for all theoretically possible and empirically observed combinations of conditions and outcomes. 
In its basic version, conditions and outcome are represented in so-called crisp sets (i.e., in dichotomous 
variables that can either take the value one or zero). In general, a condition (X) is identified as necessary 
for the outcome (Y), when X is present in all cases where Y occurs. In other words, when Y is a subset of X, 
X is a necessary condition for the occurrence of Y (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007). 
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A condition is sufficient when X is a subset of Y (i.e., every time X is observed the outcome Y 
occurs). These relationships are not restricted to single conditions, but can also occur for combinations of 
conditions. QCA is also based on the concept of asymmetric causality of relationships: The existence of an 
outcome and its nonexistence need to be assessed in separate analyses (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007). 
 
In the fuzzy set version of QCA (which was employed in this study), variable values are not 
restricted to be binary, but can also be partial members and therefore take values between one and zero. 
This provides more flexibility and yields a more realistic representation of reality when conditions and 
outcomes do not come in a binary fashion. At the same time, this also leads to a more complex procedure 
to identify necessary and sufficient conditions. 
 
All in all, regression analysis and QCA follow different logic. Whereas regression analysis assumes 
that input factors can independently (and additively) explain the outcome, QCA allows for combinations of 
conditions to influence the dependent variable. In that sense, the two methods complement each other quite 
well as applying both in a parallel fashion can be considered a robustness check, not only across different 
models, but also across different logic of analysis. 
 
When employing fsQCA, the observed values of the variables need to be calibrated to fit the (1;0) 
scale. The calibration procedure is of vital importance in the process because it has a heavy impact on the 
results of the analysis. Apart from full membership (1) and full nonmembership (0), another important 
anchor point is 0.5, which indicates the point of maximal ambiguity. The empirical values are then 
transformed into the fuzzy set accordingly, maintaining the relative differences between cases. Table 3 
displays the qualitative anchors used in our study to calibrate the empirical values observed. 
 






MPER Media performance 0–1 High media performance 0.25, 0.1, 0.0 








PSM Public service media [0,1] Strong public service 
broadcasting sector 
Crisp set 
REVGR Revenue growth −4.17–10.51 High revenue growth 0.45, 0.05, 0.00 
NPGR Net profit growth −338.93–126 High profit growth 1, 0, −1 
 
Membership in the set “high media performance” means that journalistic goals were mentioned in 
at least 25% of a letter’s paragraphs. This might appear to be a low value; however, considering that the 
objects of observation are primarily directed at shareholders, dominance of journalistic goals cannot be 
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expected. Due to the novelty of our approach and a consequential lack of other available theoretical and 
empirical reference points, we considered a 25% threshold reasonable. 
 
Our measures for market concentration were calibrated according to regulatory practice standards 
from the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010). They consider markets with 
an HHI of 1,500 and lower to be highly competitive. Moderate competition is assumed at a value of 2,000, 
and markets with an HHI of above 2,500 exhibit low competition. Accordingly, the anchor points are 1,500 
(full membership), 2,000 (maximum ambiguity), and 2,500 (full nonmembership), so that membership of 
the set of “high industry-specific competition intensity” means that Company X is part of an industry with 
an HHI of 1,500 or lower. Along these lines, we decided to consider full membership in the set of “high 
cross-industry competition intensity” for companies that operate in countries with an MPI of 1,500 or lower. 
 
Please note that for the sake of easier interpretation of the results, HHI and MPI are “reverse coded” 
so that low values of HHI and MPI represent high competition intensity. 
 
Membership in the set “high revenue growth” means that a company had increased revenues by 
at least 45% compared with the previous year. This is based on industry considerations, where revenue 
growth of more than 45% for established companies is often considered high, and 5% revenue growth is 
considered regular growth (e.g., Baremetrics, 2020). All companies that experience zero revenue growth or 
less fall in the nonmembership group. We considered doubling profits high profit growth and a decrease in 
profits of at least 100% low profit growth. For “high profit growth” set membership, companies therefore 
must have at least doubled their profits compared with the previous year. Constant profits served as the 
0.5 anchor, whereas companies that exhibited a loss of profits of at least 100% were put in the 
nonmembership group. 
 






Table 4 displays the main results from the regression analysis. For the sake of clarity, we do not 
show coefficients for the control variables (with the exception of the share of each report’s paragraphs that 
included economic and societal goals), although they were included in all estimations (control variables are 
listed in the Method section). 
 
Apart from the control variables mentioned above, we also included economic and societal goals to 
better understand the relationship between different types of goals. Unsurprisingly, societal and journalistic 
goals (noneconomic goals) were complementary, although there was no reliable statistical connection 
between economic and journalistic goals; statistical significance was only marginal in most cases and effect 
sizes were low, as denoted by the relative low values of the standardized regression coefficients. 
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We ran a total of four models for two reasons. First, we ran a separate analysis for the HHI and 
the MPI because they are conceptually closely related and are proxies for the same construct (competition 
intensity). Second, we also included squared terms of both the HHI and MPI to account for the possibility of 
decreasing marginal rates of return and eventually a nonlinear relationship between competition intensity 
and media performance (e.g., in the form of a unimodal function). This allowed us to test the hypothesis 
that an increase in competition has a positive impact on media performance only for low and medium levels 
of competition, and a negative impact for higher levels of competition, as put forward by the HA. 
 
Table 4. Regression Results. 
 Model 
Journalistic goals 1 2 3 4 
     
Economic goals .094** .087* .094** .086* 
Societal goals .332*** .337*** .334*** .333*** 
     
HHI −.232*** −.495**   
HHI_2  .261   
      
MPI   −.221*** −.388* 
MPI_2    .175 
      
PSM −.180*** −.149** −.198*** −.197*** 
R2 .275 .276 .276 .275 
Observed 474 474 474 474 
Note. HHI = Hirschman–Herfindahl Index; MPI = National Media Power Index; PSM = public service 
media. Ordinary least squares estimates. Standardized regression coefficients. All models include year 
fixed effects. Shaded values indicate statistically significant effects of competition intensity.  
*p < 0.1. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Results indicate that competition intensity has a positive impact on media performance. Higher 
values of both the HHI and MPI indicate lower levels of competition. In all four models, the linear coefficient 
for competition intensity (HHI, MPI) was statistically significant and negative, which is why lower competition 
levels lead to lower levels of media performance. At the same time, the quadratic terms in Models 2 and 4 
exhibited no statistical significance. Considering that the data set included countries with very high 
concentration rates, and is therefore not restricted to low and medium levels of competition intensity, the 
results do not support a unimodal relationship between competition and media performance as hypothesized 
with the HA. 
 
When it comes to the impact of a strong public service broadcasting sector on media performance, 
the results clearly imply a negative relationship. In all four models, the coefficient for the dummy variable 
PSM was negative, providing evidence for a kind of “crowding out” effect rather than PSM causing a “race 
to the top” with commercial media companies as claimed by the British Broadcasting Company (2013) 
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report. On the contrary, competition from PSM appears to incentivize commercial media companies to turn 
away from journalistic goals. 
 
Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
The two quality criteria to identify (combinations of) conditions as necessary or sufficient were 
consistency and coverage. First, the consistency criterion indicates “the degree to which the cases sharing a 
given combination of conditions . . . agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). For 
necessary conditions, Ragin (2000) proposes a threshold value of 90% for consistency. In our sample, we did 
not find any necessary conditions for the outcome, nor did the analysis identify necessary conditions for the 
negated outcome (low media performance). We therefore turned to the identification of sufficient conditions. 
 
The threshold of consistency for sufficient conditions, as proposed by Ragin (2008), was 80%. We 
also used a more conservative 90% threshold, as suggested by other research, which yielded solutions that 
included all five tested conditions and very low coverage. Given that the 80% threshold also matched the 
empirical data quite well, where the first substantial consistency gap in the truth table occurred between 
0.806 and 0.782, we report only the results based on this threshold. Three potentially sufficient 
combinations of conditions for the high media performance outcome were identified: (1) high competition 
intensity (HHI) and no strong PSM sector, (2) high competition intensity (MPI) and no strong PSM sector, 
and (3) no strong PSM sector and high revenue growth and low net profit growth. The results are 
summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Intermediate Solution for the Outcome “High Media Performance.” 
Combination Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
HHIf*psm 0.418 0.091 0.732 
MPIf*psm 0.327 0.022 0.802 
psm*REVGRf*npgrf 0.221 0.068 0.841 
Solution coverage: 0.529 
 Solution consistency: 0.744  
Note. HHI = Hirschman–Herfindahl Index; MPI = National Media Power Index; psm = public service 
media; REVGR = revenue growth; npgr = net profit growth. Intermediate solutions. Variables in capital 
letters indicate membership and lower case letters indicate nonmembership. *Indicates the logical link 
“and.” The letter “f” following a variable indicates fuzz set variables. 
 
For reference, the parsimonious solution yielded the identical outcome as the intermediate solution 
presented in Table 5. The complex solution identified four potentially sufficient combinations of conditions 
for the high media performance outcome: HHIf*psm; mpif*psm*REVGRf; MPIf*psm*revgrf*npgrf; 
MPIf*psm*REVGRf*NPGRf (see Table 3 for variable definitions). 
 
The coverage criterion represents the empirical relevance of a solution comparable to the goodness-
of-fit/explained variance metric (R2) in ordinary least squares regressions. The rather low coverage values 
imply that there were other sufficient conditions for high media performance that were not covered by our 
data set. Consequently, results from the fsQCA must be interpreted with caution. However, it is striking that 
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the absence of strong PSM was part of all and high competition intensity was part of most of the sufficient 
conditions, underscoring the results from the regression analysis and making a quite strong case for the 
importance of these two factors in causing high media performance. 
 
As mentioned above, QCA is based on asymmetric causality. We therefore also needed to consider 
the negation of the outcome. When analyzing the data for necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome 
“low media performance,” we found no (combination of) conditions that met the consistency criteria. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Employing a fixed effects regression analysis, as well as fsQCA, we found evidence for both a 
positive effect of competition intensity and a negative effect of a strong PSM sector on media performance 
from commercial media companies. 
 
The results across four different models were highly consistent in the regression analysis. Both 
concentration rate variables (HHI and MPI) exhibited statistically significant negative coefficients, indicating 
a positive effect of competition intensity on media performance. We did not find any evidence of a curvilinear 
relationship as proposed by the FCA, HA, and research on diversity. The dummy variable for the existence 
of a strong PSM sector also showed statistical significance and implies a negative effect. 
 
The QCA revealed three combinations of conditions that are sufficient for high media performance. 
Although all three combinations of conditions that form a sufficient condition rely on all of the conditions 
that are part of the respective combination, it is striking that high competition appeared in two of the three 
and the absence of a strong PSM sector appeared in all three combinations. We interpret this as confirmation 
of the results we obtained from the regression analysis. 
 
Considering that we applied two analytical methods that are based on different logic, we find this 
to be a rather strong empirical case speaking in favor of competition having a positive impact on media 
performance, with the exception of PSM, which appear to crowd commercial companies out of the market 
for high-quality journalistic content. 
 
For policymakers, this implies that competitive markets are in the public interest in terms of 
strengthening media performance and therefore the functioning of democratic societies. Although the 
negative impact of a strong PSM system on media performance could be used as an argument against such 
a system, it must be mentioned that the overall welfare effect of PSM can still be positive. For instance, PSM 
can potentially contribute significantly to an informed public, in particular because they are in large part 
independent of economic influences and because they are obliged to provide public service content by law. 
These effects should be emphasized when they have a significant market share, which corresponds to our 
definition of strong PSM. This is supported by empirical research (for a summary, see Nielsen, Fletcher, 
Sehl, & Levy, 2016). In addition, recent cross-national comparative research suggests that the economic 
performance of commercial media is not significantly affected by PSM (Sehl et al., 2020). 
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Our study contributes to existing research in several ways. First, our approach of operationalizing 
company media performance by using letters to shareholders in annual reports is new. Second, our data 
set comprised companies from 12 countries and five continents, significantly expanding the scope of existing 
research in this domain and providing new opportunities regarding the generalizability of the results. Third, 
we employed a combination of two empirical methods to validate our findings. 
 
However, our research is also subject to several limitations. First, the validity of the data for 
dependent variables is hard to objectively assess. On the one hand, there is no hard calibration value for 
media performance, which makes external validation difficult. On the other hand, prior research has found 
letters to shareholders to be appropriate sources for the assessment of corporate goals and face validity 
appears to confirm this. In turn, we believe that the relative importance of journalistic goals should be a 
good proxy for media performance as it states the priority of the respective companies’ priorities that should 
have, to a certain degree, a significant impact on output’s public value. Second, we measured competition 
intensity with simple concentration measures (HHI and MPI), although competition can certainly also be 
subject to other qualitative aspects, such as whether markets are contestable (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 
1982) and the degree of commodification of the product. Third, we only assessed competition factors; other 
(national) variables also certainly impact media performance (e.g., the local journalistic culture; Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004; Hanitzsch et al., 2019), and should be included in future research. Countries in our sample 
were also not selected systematically in terms of a most similar or most different systems design, but rather 
because of rough comparability conditions and data availability. 
 
Fourth, we focused on competition at the national level even though competition has obviously 
become global in most media markets. However, this only applies to a limited extent to competition in 
journalism, which continues to take place strongly at the domestic level of every single country partly 
because its content is mostly locally oriented and language dependent. Furthermore, in terms of journalism, 
regulation and policymaking are still primarily taking place at the national level (Picard, 2020). 
 
Amid digitization and platformization, traditional media companies are still perceived as key players 
in the production and distribution of journalism. Our research has applied a novel methodological approach 
in a cross-national context to shed light on competitive conditions under which these companies commit to 
specific journalistic goals and thus contribute to media performance. In doing so, we addressed a persistent 
gap in research on media competition and media performance, and identified avenues for media regulators. 
 
Our analysis is dominated by established media companies that significantly rely on print and 
broadcasting. However, our findings on the relationship between competition and media performance could 
also be applied to the assessment of digital media markets, where competition intensity is amplified 
compared with traditional media markets. At the same time, it remains a challenge to empirically assess 
the effects of competition on market and journalistic outcomes for these relatively new digital markets, 
where market equilibria are unlikely to have emerged by now. This is why our study could contribute to a 
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